Thursday, October 01, 2026

Metro's 1978 plan: promises made, promises kept, promises broken

Another excellent guest post from Oscar Slotboom with some of Houston METRO's lost history from the archives of Barry Klein, RIP.
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Civic activist Barry Klein died in June. He is best known for his successful efforts to prevent zoning in Houston. He also demanded accountability from the Metro transit agency (officially called the Metropolitan Transit Authority, or MTA), particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. I took possession of Barry's transportation-related archives, and I will share a few items in this and future posts. Today's featured item is the original plan for Metro.
Prior to the August 12, 1978, public election to create the Metro, the interim board advocating the creation of Metro published a 29-page booklet called "Metropolitan Transit Authority — Metro — Regional Transit Plan". The booklet is a detailed plan and guide for the transit agency, with management objectives, instructions for governance, and projects to undertake. Let's take a look at what was promised, and what actually happened.
Transit fares and operational cost
The most eye-opening objective was to finance a minimum of 40% of operational cost from transit fares. On page 28 in the section "Operations" the document says
The MTA Board is committed by formal resolution to securing 40-50% of the annual cost of operations from farebox revenues. This is significantly higher than for many other large systems, but the METRO user must pay a fair share of the cost of operations.
On page 12 in the section "Cost-Effectiveness" the document says
Transit revenues should be increased in proportion to operating costs so that the percentage of cost offset by system revenue remains in the range of 40-50%. In no event shall application of service standards result in erosion of the total system revenue/cost ratio below 40%.
On pages 8 and 9 in the section "MTA Goals and Objectives" the document lists the following objective
Increase transit revenues in proportion to operating cost increases so that the percentage of cost offset by system revenue remains in the range of 40-50%, in order to:
  • maintain the overall financial soundness and efficiency of the system; and
  • encourage constant review of each transit service efficiency and operating cost
Well, we know how that promise turned out. (See 2025 Metro report for full analysis.) In 2025 Metro's operating cost was $1.076 billion and it collected $48.8 million in fares, which covered 4.53% of operating cost.
The Metro web site has financial statements back to 2001, and financial data prior to 2001 is not readily available. A January 6, 1991, report in the Houston Chronicle stated, "The recovery rate is now less than 30%." In 2001 fares were 15.3% of operational cost and performance has steadily become worse with only a minimal recovery from the Covid low of 3.4%. The average fare collected per boarding in 2025 was $0.62, which on an inflation-adjusted basis is the lowest since 2001 and almost surely the lowest in Houston's transit history. The taxpayer subsidy per boarding was $13.07 in 2025.
The 2026 Public Transportation Fact Book (page 5) reports national totals for all transit for 2024, with $11.464 billion in fares collected and $66.682 billion operating expense, which is a national average of 17.2% of operating expense covered by fares. The original Metro objective was to be better than comparable transit systems, but it is now much worse than the national average.
Getting federal money at any cost
On page 26 the document states
The MTA Board has recognized that the availability of federal tax dollars is no reason to construct a costly and unused system, as has occurred in other cities. The development of a cautious, flexible system, coupled with voter commitment of a local tax source to transit, however, is the only way to obtain this area's fair share of federal transit funds.
The first sentence is a gem of wisdom which, in an ideal world, would be followed by all transit agencies in the United States. Sadly, agencies typically follow the logic of the second sentence, which is to build expensive projects mainly to get "free" federal money. Even with federal money, local agencies typically must issue debt to pay the local share of construction cost and also pay long-term operational and maintenance costs.
Metro's record is better than most transit agencies. Early Metro efforts focused on the low-cost and adaptable HOV system which serves buses, vanpools, carpools and (later) toll-paying vehicles. The first effort to build rail was squashed by Mayor Bob Lanier in the 1990s. After Lanier's exit, the first 7.5-mile section of the Red Line opened in 2004, but was built at a very low cost by modern standards, around $324 million. For comparison, the planned Austin light rail, which will be at street level very similar to Houston Metro's light rail, will cost $8.2 billion for 9.8 miles, $837 million per mile.
Metro succumbed to the "get federal money" logic for the light rail expansion. If there ever was an "exhibit A" for an ill-conceived rail line, it would be the Green and Purple Lines. These routes cost $1.41 billion to build ($153 million per mile). Metro's long-term debt excluding commercial paper and capital leases increased $551.3 million from 2011 ($301.2 million) to 2012 ($852.5 million) for the light rail expansion. Long-term debt peaked at $1.078 billion in 2016 and currently stands at $692.9 million. Ridership on the Green and Purple Lines is very low, comparable to conventional bus routes. During the last 12 months, the Green Line averaged 3940 weekday boardings and the Purple Line averaged 4626 weekday boardings. For comparison, in July, a low ridership month, 13 bus routes had ridership over 4000 weekday riders (although they are longer than the rail lines).
The good news is that Metro has built less light rail than other cities, which has limited the financial damage. In June I did a comparison of Metro to Dallas DART. Dallas has a 119-mile light rail system with 93 miles converging on downtown. Dallas light rail has not increased DART ridership or revitalized downtown. Per-capita ridership is about the same in Dallas (20.5) as Houston (19.5), even though Metro's service area is nearly twice as large as DART's. DART's long-term debt, incurred to build the light rail system, is $4.03 billion. As I detailed in the June post, businesses and sports teams are fleeing downtown Dallas and its light rail hub, causing a grim outlook for the future of downtown Dallas and expected ridership decline.
Broken promises for railroad crossing separations
On page 20 the document states
The Metropolitan Transit Authority proposes construction of 30-50 railroad grade crossing separations over a ten-year period between 1979 and 1988.
The list of 51 candidate locations is in the scanned documents below, and I mapped them for easy viewing. Here we are 48 years later and only 10 separations have been built. Three were done by HCTRA, three were done by TxDOT, one was done by Metro (Harrisburg along the Green Line) and I was not able to determine the funding for the remaining three. (Click spreadsheet image for details. It's possible Metro contributed funding to the three with unknown funding.)
The plan for railroad crossing separations targeted building projects by 1988, but very little was done. In 1988 Metro began funding the General Mobility Program (called infrastructure assistance in its financial statement), which returns sales tax revenue to local governments where tax revenue originates, targeting 25% of sales tax annually. As a practical matter, Metro's role in funding specific projects ended when it began the general mobility program. The recipients of General Mobility funds appear to have allocated funds to their priorities without regard to the original Metro plan. The City of Houston is the main recipient of General Mobility funds, and its 2025 comprehensive financial report (page 148) states that it received $190.1 from Metro and allocated $51.8 million to Capital Projects, $110.9 million to Special Revenue Funds and $27.4 million to the General Fund. Beyond that statement, it is very difficult to find the trail of money and its ultimate use. (Which Special Revenue Funds? It seems impossible to determine from the financial statement.)
While Metro's 1978 list may not reflect today's priorities, the need for railroad grade separations has not diminished. The December 2024 fatality of a Milby High School student (1, 2) focused attention on railroad crossings, with the Chronicle doing a multi-part series called "Dangerous Crossings". Nowhere in the report does the Chronicle mention that Metro promised a large program to build grade separations. In fact, in this article the Chronicle blames just about everyone except Metro: "The mayors. The school superintendents. The state lawmakers. The Congress members and senators. And yes, the train executives, who time and again would promise to improve rail safety but rarely delivered."
In a December 2024 editorial former Metro board member Christof Spieler proposed a large-scale program of railroad grade separations. He doesn't mention that the railroad separation program Metro promised to voters was mostly ignored by Metro and the subsequent recipients of Metro General Mobility funds.
Partially in response to the Milby fatality, the Texas Legislature in 2025 approved a special $250 million program for railroad separations. TxDOT is paying for the $10 million new separation at Milby High School, and $40 million is allocated for a separation at the intersection of Griggs, Long and Mykawa Roads. TxDOT recently received a $756 million federal grant for railroad separations, including three in the Houston area along US 90A in Missouri City and Sugar Land. TxDOT is completing the environmental process for two new separations along Hirsh road at Tidwell and Little York. TxDOT is now the leader in planning and funding future railroad crossing separations in Houston.
Broken promises for street intersection grade separations
On page 19 the document states
Where excessive delay to transit and/or vehicle flow is identified along major arterial streets, the Metropolitan Transit Authority will enter into joint funding commitments with local governments for the construction of grade separations or major intersection redesign. The Metropolitan Transit Authority will dedicate funding over the period 1979-1988 for improvement of 10-15 intersections. Additional intersections may be added dependent upon the participation of local governments.
The list of 19 candidate locations is in the scanned documents below, and I mapped them for easy viewing. Here we are 48 years later and only 6 separations have been built. Four separations were built by TxDOT, one (South Post Oak at South Main, phase 1 built around 1984) was at least partially done by TxDOT (US 90A bridge) and for one I don't know the funding agency (South Post Oak at West Bellfort).
Just like railroad separations, Metro mostly or totally ignored the promised projects in its plan, and subsequent recipients of General Mobility funding have also done very little for intersection improvement.
Intersection improvement needs have changed in the 48 years since the 1978 Metro list, but I can definitely confirm that two locations on the original list are still problem spots that need improvement: Richmond at Weslayan and FM 1960 at Steubner-Airline (Veterans Memorial). Four other intersections urgently needing improvement based on today's needs are Chimney Rock at Richmond, Fountainview at Richmond, JFK Boulevard at Greens Road (Bush airport entrance) and South Post Oak at Willowbend.
I remember reports of plans for a separation at Gessner and Westheimer as far back as the 1970s when I was a kid in Sharpstown. It never happened, but is still listed in the H-GAC long term plan (page 21). Could it actually get done after a 50-year delay? I'll believe it when I see it. An amusing historical tidbit I remember is the construction of the South Post Oak Road separation at South Main, around 1984. All the bridge beams were put in position, and then there was a pause in construction. Radio station KLOL had a late-night weekly television show featuring rock group music videos and comedy bits. They did a farcical news report about the the bridge deck being stolen, with authorities looking for the missing pavement. (It was humor that registered with me!)
Generally speaking, the Houston area has been a poor performer in the improvement of intersections. This is a shame, because bottleneck reduction at intersections is the easiest and most feasible way to improve traffic flow. For comparison, the Dallas-Fort Worth area has a long-running program of intersection improvements, which normally includes dual left-turn lanes and dedicated right turn lanes. In North Texas it's matter of policy to upgrade intersection design to modern standards. Here, it's entirely hit-and-miss but mostly miss, with intersection improvements mostly random and mostly on TxDOT-managed streets like FM 1960 and Westheimer.
Conclusion
Nearly 50 years after Metro presented its founding plan to voters in 1978, we can look back and conclude that Metro has mostly kept some promises but totally failed for others.
Metro promised to be financially conserverative, saying on page 28, "The MTA Board is committed to a conservative approach fiscally, operationally and technologically," and on page 26, "By the use of free public right-of-way and commitment to a flexible system using reliable, proven technology, METRO will keep costs to an essential level and avoid the costly mistakes of other cities." That promise has mostly been achieved. Metro focused on bus service and the low-cost, adaptable HOV system in its first 25 years. In 1988 it formalized its General Mobility Program to share revenue with member cities. The first section of the Red Line opened in 2004 was built at a very low cost and achieved good ridership until Covid. Limited light rail construction has limited the financial damage which light rail inflicts, even with the ill-advised Green and Purple lines. Metro carries a relatively low debt burden, $693 million in 2025.
The largest failure is Metro's promise to finance a reasonable percentage of operations with fare revenue. Metro promised a goal to finance 40% of operational cost with fares, but hasn't been anywhere close to that target in the last 25 years and in 2025 fares covered only 4.3% of operational costs. The finances of Metro have become overwhelmingly focused on transit boarding subsidies. It collected $1.086 billion in sales tax in 2025, and its operating loss was $1.027 billion, 95% of sales tax revenue. Every time someone stepped on a bus or train in 2025, taxpayers contributed $13.07.
Metro's 1978 plan promised voters an ambitious program of railroad crossing separations and intersection improvements in its first 10 years, but little or nothing was done. In 1988 Metro started its General Mobility Program to share sales tax revenue with member cities, and the cities, particularly the City of Houston, mostly ignored the projects listed in Metro's plan.
A plan formulated at a certain time, in this case 1978 during a period of huge population growth and mobility crisis, has a limited shelf-life of validity. In 48 years, much has changed in the transportation landscape to reduce public demand for transit and make service much more expensive: employers moving to the suburbs, employees working from home, dramatically increased cost for all construction especially the astronomical increase for rail construction since the early 2000s, and shifting political priorities in favor of huge fare subsidies. With self-driving cars now operational on a limited basis including here in Houston, we can expect more disruption and transit demand reduction in the future. (influencer videos 1, 2, 3)
As I've stated before in my annual analysis of Metro's financial statements, the management directive of Metro should be to provide bus service to the transit-dependent sector at the lowest possible cost to taxpayers. I have advocated reducing the boarding subsidy to its pre-Covid level of $10.96 per boarding, and preferably lower. Costly projects like light rail and bus rapid transit must be avoided because they incur debt and don't increase ridership. Going forward, we can hope that Metro will be open to adopting new technology as self-driving cars continue to make progress to the mainstream, potentially reducing costs to taxpayers and dramatically increasing convenience for its customers.

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posted by Max Concrete @ 12:57 PM 0 comments

Wednesday, July 22, 2026

High Speed Rail Update: the alignment in northwest Harris County is (unofficially) DEAD, but could Terafab make a Robotaxi project possible?

Updated August 6 with new information about Terafab, and some speculation about another possible outcome for the corridor (see Terafab section). Additional minor updates in the Terafab section on August 31 and September 18.
On September 19 Channel 2 posted an investigative report about the project with a 10-minute video. Unfortunately it is a big disappointment with nearly no new information. Scroll to the end of this post to see my comments about the report.
Another excellent guest post from Oscar Slotboom, author of Houston Freeways. Honestly, I’m glad Texas HSR is dead because it was always going to end up a taxpayer boondoggle one way or another (eventual private bankruptcy and government rescue once partially or fully built). Here's a 2022 post on why the economics never made sense.
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With the recent demolition of Northwest Mall, it's a good time for an update about the proposed high speed rail project between Houston and Dallas. Most of the Northwest Mall property is owned by an affiliate of Texas High-Speed Rail Holdings LLC (THSR), formerly called Texas Central, and is slated for the Houston station. In news reports (1, 2) a project representative was quoted saying the demolition "will allow the project to proceed as soon as we get the green light." At the minimum this statement is disingenuous, and most likely is a complete lie.
The findings of my investigation into the Harris County alignment lead to only one conclusion: the northwest Harris County alignment is dead. Multiple subdivisions have been built in the path of the approved alignment, and a new Blinn College campus with a large first building underway has been established directly in the alignment path. There is no way the project can be built on the officially approved alignment.
This doesn't necessarily mean the overall project is dead. It means there would need to be a supplemental environmental study to define a new alignment. With rapid development in northwest Harris County, it will be difficult to identify a new alignment. And looming over the alignment problem is the outrageous cost, which is now around $40 billion.
However, the situation is different in North Texas. Political leadership in the NCTCOG Regional Transportation Council believes the Houston-to-Dallas project will (eventually) be built. The council has spent $10.9 million since 2020 and ignited political strife with the City of Dallas attempting to obtain environmental clearance for extending the rail line from Dallas to Fort Worth.
The Planned Alignment in Houston
The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the project was released on May 29, 2020. It defines the officially approved alignment for the entire corridor. You can download it here. The detailed map showing the corridor in Harris County is appendix G-3, and the footprint map for the southern segment including Harris County is volume 5. You can also see alignment maps on the web site, although they don't match the FEIS alignment in far northwest Harris County (more below in the Binford Creek section).
This analysis is mainly focused on land development which has occurred in the path of the FEIS alignment since the release of the FEIS. Generally speaking, as soon as an FEIS is approved, corridor preservation and right-of-way acquisition should proceed at full speed, especially when development is occurring in the path of the alignment. As we'll see, the corridor has not been preserved except in two spots – Sanford Farms and part of The Grand Prairie.
In Houston, the FEIS alignment starts at the Northwest Mall site. Demolition of Northwest Mall took place in April and May (news reports 1, 2). As of July 21, there were large piles of leftover aggregate with processing and recycling apparently being done on site.
According to THSR's statement, the demolition is ostensibly for the rail project. This helps maintain a public perception that the project is alive and viable. As a practical matter, the mall needed to be demolished regardless of the future of the high speed rail project.
There is a complication with the Northwest Mall site. Most (45.25 acres) of the mall site is owned by "Cadiz Development Houston LLC", which is an affiliate of THSR created for station development. But the 10-acre north parking lot, 9500 Hempstead Road on HCAD, is owned by "NW JCP LTD" since January 2009, which predates THSR. As of July 21 there is a "Land For Sale" sign on the property, which strongly suggests the current owner does not have a partnership with THSR, or is trying to maximize the price of the property. Not having this tract is inconvenient for comprehensive site redevelopment, for example a sports arena. The FEIS footprint map (page 101) shows the entire site as part of the project, so THSR should be able to use eminent domain to acquire it.
Northwest Mall on April 25, 2026
Northwest Mall on May 15, 2026
10 acres on the north side of the site is not owned by TSHR and is for sale. Photo date 21-July-2026.
Leaving the mall site, the FEIS alignment proceeds northwest on an elevated structure above Hempstead Road. At West Little York, the alignment moves to the south side of the Union Pacific tracks and drops to ground level to go under Beltway 8, then returns to an elevated structure.
The easement specified in the FEIS shows many displacements south of the Union Pacific tracks, mostly warehouses and lower-tier commercial properties which are politically easy to acquire, although some will be expensive. Looking at HCAD property listings between West Little York and Huffmeister (just west of State Highway 6), I don't see any properties with ownership listed as an entity which is obviously affiliated with the project, so it appears no property acquistion has been done.
West of Huffmeister, 63 homes in the White Oak Falls neighborhood are needed for the train corridor. THSR (then Texas Central) acquired 41 of these homes between December 2019 and March 2020. Channel 2 has reported twice about mismanagement of these properties, on August 6, 2024 and October 9, 2025 (video). Many homes owned by THSR were abandoned and not maintained, with squatters and criminal activity reported by neighborhood residents. I visited this area on July 20 and found the situation has been mostly cleaned up since the Channel 2 reports. Only four houses have visible damage or vandalism, mainly broken windows. About 13 homes are posted with no trespassing signs and appear to be unoccupied, and the rest are in good condition and/or occupied. It seems like a questionable decision to buy the homes first, instead of buying vacant land which was at risk for development. The situation was obviously mismanaged, causing grief for the neighborhood and avoidable expenditures for THSR.
Going west from the White Oak Falls neighborhood to Fry Road, I reviewed HCAD records and found no properties with ownership listed as THSR or an obvious affiliate. Plenty of displacements are anticipated in the FEIS, mostly easy-to-acquire lower-tier commercial properties.
After release of the FEIS, a warehouse was built in the path of the alignment at Barker Cypress. It will be easy to acquire but has a structure property tax value of $14.4 million.
At Fry Road the alignment shifts southward, away from US 290 and the Union Pacific railroad. Then the trouble starts. When the FEIS was prepared in the late 2010s, the land south of US 290 between Cypress and Hockley was nearly entirely vacant, which is shown in the alignment map. Substantial development has occurred in the path of the planned alignment in the 2020s
Dunham Pointe
In the FEIS alignment map (pages 69 and 70), the area which is now the Dunham Pointe development was still vacant land. Over 30 homes have now been built in the FEIS alignment, with homes costing up to $1 million currently being built directly in or very close to the path of the FEIS alignment by Toll Brothers and Tri-Pointe Homes. I spoke to representatives of both builders. They say the rail corridor is definitely not coming through the neighborhood, but they were unable provide any official documentation to support that claim. The development plan for Dunham Pointe on its web site does not include any provision for the high speed rail corridor.
At this location the FEIS alignment crosses Flowering Sage Way, which is full of high-dollar homes built by Toll Brothers.
This Toll Brothers home under construction at the corner of Elegant Azalea and Winding Angelica is directly in the path of the FEIS alignment.
Jubilee
Proceeding west from Dunham Pointe, the alignment remains clear of development for the next 4 miles (for now) and then reaches the rapidly expanding Jubilee development. The master plan (shown below with the alignment annotated) does not indicate any provision for the rail corridor. Housing construction has not yet reached the FEIS alignment corridor, but at the southern end of Jubilee Haven Boulevard I could see site work in progress in the distance, possibly in the FEIS corridor.
A home lot map available on the Jubilee site shows brown earth very close to the FEIS alignment path. With the new schools under construction north of the alignment, I think we can expect housing construction to start in the path of the alignment in the near future.
The Grand Prairie and Sanford Farms
Sanford Farms and The Grand Prairie are the only two spots where there is a provision for the FEIS alignment. Retention ponds are built along the alignment, which would allow the elevated structure to be built without any home displacements. But residents may not be thrilled to have the elevated structure coming through the middle of their neighborhoods. The map below shows the FEIS alignment through the area.
However, on the southwest corner of Warren Ranch Road and Baethe Road housing is being built in the alignment path. This photo looks along Prairie Rush Drive where the FEIS alignment comes through at a shallow angle (about 20 degrees from parallel to the street).
In The Grand Prairie, HCAD records show the retention pond land owner is mostly Lennar Homes with a smaller parcel owned by "SB-HS Lot Option Pool 01 LP". I spoke to a sales representative for Lennar Homes who told me that around the end of 2025 they stopped requiring homebuyers to sign a disclosure statement about the rail corridor. The plat for the area in the photo below says the retention pond is "Restricted to open space/landscape/incidental utilities/detention".
The FEIS alignment comes through at this spot on Mesquite Field Drive. If built, it will be an elevated structure over the detention pond going straight ahead.
The FEIS plan shows an area for a "Rail systems site" (electrical substation), and a large "Temporary construction area" southeast of the intersection of Betka and Kickapoo roads. This area is now filled with houses.
It is surprising that Sanford Farms is designed to accommodate the FEIS corridor, because the subdivision infrastructure was platted and built very recently in 2025. From publicly available information it's not possible to know if there was coordination with TSHR; it's possible the land developer acted independently and may have designed the subdivision years ago when it was more likely the project would be built. A sales manager for Meritage Homes told me homebuyers are not provided with a disclosure about the project. He told me internal communications say the rail project is not going to be built, so they don't need to be concerned about it. Retention ponds in Sanford Farms are jointly owned by Meritage Homes and "Century Land Holdings of Texas LLC".
The FEIS alignment is straight ahead through the retention pond in Sanford Farms. If the rail project is built, an elevated structure will be built here.
North of Sanford Farms the path remains clear, but a large structure has been built in a planned temporary construction area.
The New Blinn College Waller Campus
There is a construction site just getting started along FM 2920 with a large sign announcing "Future Home of Blinn College District". There are deep piles being sunk, so work is clearly for a large building. It turns out this is the site of the new 100-acre Blinn College Waller Campus, and this is the first of many planned buildings.
This image shows the site map from the Blinn College press release, with annotations added to indicate the construction zone and the FEIS alignment through the middle of the property. The land was purchased in October 2024. (video)
This is a depiction of the first building on the campus, with a cost of $68 million (press release).
Here are views of construction, with work just getting started
I was not able to find a master plan for the campus, and at this early point in construction I could not determine if the building is in the path of the FEIS alignment. If it's not in the path, its eastern edge will be very close. It is unlikely the campus is intended to accommodate the rail corridor, which in the FEIS (pages 58 and 59) is elevated at FM 2920 but on embankment on the north half of the Blinn property. At the groundbreaking ceremony the Chancellor of Blinn made the following statement (see video at link)
The academic building we celebrate today will be the first structure on this new 100-acre campus. It will serve as the foundation for future campus development ...
This view looks north from FM 2920 along the FEIS alignment. The pine tree ahead is in the middle of the FEIS alignment, and the building construction site is to the left (west). Foundation work is starting on its west end and progressing in the direction of this view.
Binford Creek
Just north of the Blinn campus site is the Binford Creek subdivision. The area of Binford Creek was vacant land in the FEIS maps, but is now a subdivision filled with houses. The FEIS footprint map (page 56, shown below) shows most of the area of the Binford Creek subdivision was targeted to be a permanent maintenance-of-way facility (MOWF) for the rail project, but the image below shows that the entire area is now a subdivision.
The photo below looks north along Willow River Canyon Lane. All the recently built houses on the right side of the street are directly in the path of the FEIS alignment.
There is a discrepancy in the alignments shown on the official web site. The alignment map shows a path west of the FEIS map path. I sent an inquiry to the THSR general inquiries email, but did not receive a response. I'm assuming the FEIS alignment is correct, but it makes no difference — both paths are now built up with houses. In the map you can see an easement running approximately parallel to Binford Road. At first glance I thought this might be a corridor preserved for the rail, but it turns out it is a 100-foot-wide easement owned by the Southeast Regional Management District utility agency and 75 feet of the width is earmarked for Lonestar Gas.
Solar Farms
Farther north in Waller County, a large solar farm has been built in the path of the FEIS alignment. Needed property can be easily acquired, but will be another substantial expense.
I reviewed the path going north all the way to Dallas. I did not find any new development in the path of the planned alignment except two solar farms. At this location there is a new electrical substation and a small area of solar panels in the path, and here there is a new solar farm.
North Texas
While there has been minimal political attention relating to high speed rail in Houston, the situation is very different in North Texas. Since around 2020, the North Central Texas Council of Governments, their equivalent to H-GAC, has coordinated studies to define an alignment to extend the high speed rail from Dallas to Fort Worth, including a station in Arlington. There is an abundance of documents on the study web site. As May 2026, NCTCOG reported spending $10.9 million on the studies (page 48). Separate from NCTCOG, three economic impact studies have been done, including a study by Fort Worth and Arlington completed a few months ago.
The environmental process is especially difficult from the bureaucratic perspective, needing to get environmental clearance from the Federal Transit Administration while also being accepted into and being in compliance with the Federal Railroad Administration "Corridor ID" program (page 47). In 2024, after considerating a huge universe of alternatives, the study announced its recommendation, which almost entirely follows the Interstate 30 corridor. Looking at the map, you can see that the recommended alternative has long tunnels in Fort Worth and Arlington, but in Dallas it was on a high elevated structure through the southwest corner of downtown. (newsletter with image shown below)
 
The original recommendation for the Fort Worth extension included an elevated structure through southwest downtown Dallas. This incited strong opposition from the City of Dallas and Hunt Realty Investments, resulting in the a new alignment farther west.
Then the trouble started. The City of Dallas was furious that the recommended design has tunnels for Fort Worth and Arlington, but a high elevated structure in downtown Dallas. The area of the downtown Dallas alignment is targeted for future redevelopment. Hunt Realty Investments, owner of Reunion Tower and adjacent Hyatt Regency, unleashed the wrath of their lawyers on NCTCOG, sending a continuous barrage of opposition and threatening letters to the NCTCOG transportation council. (examples page 74, page 57)
By August 2024 the alignment study was working to define a new alignment which avoids the Hunt property and placates the City of Dallas. This map shows the two alignments, with the east (dark blue) the original recommended alignment and the new west (light blue) alignment which mostly avoids southwest downtown Dallas but still has a short section inside the downtown Dallas freeway loop.
In January 2026 Dallas City Council reaffirmed a previous 2024 resolution which opposed any elevated structure inside the downtown Dallas freeway loop. As of May 2026 (page 49), it was believed that Dallas would oppose any elevated structure anywhere inside the downtown Dallas freeway loop, which would preclude the planned western alignment since it briefly goes inside the freeway loop and could potentially entirely kill the extension to Fort Worth. To get a feeling for the opinion of Dallas, listen to the commentary from a Dallas City Council member starting at 2:18:57 in this video. She summarizes by saying "It's really outrageous the way [the alignment study process] has gone forward." Negotiations were on hold during the summer due to the World Cup, but should resume soon.
I can't find an official cost estimate for the Dallas-to-Fort Worth section, but anything with tunnels is certain to be outrageously expensive. During a NCTCOG meeting a cost of $12 billion was mentioned. (1:00:00 in this video)
All of this effort in North Texas is contingent on the Houston-to-Dallas project actually being built. Does NCTGOG and its politically powerful director Michael Morris know something that I don't know? Maybe. But I'm also inclined to wonder if Morris is aware of the alignment becoming nonviable in Houston.
A New Wildcard: Terafab (Updated Sept. 18, 2026)
The FEIS alignment includes a station east of College Station called the Brazos Valley station. This station seemed politically motivated to help gain support from that area. It is located in the middle of nowhere (at Roans Prairie near the intersection of state highways 30 and 90), 25 miles from the Texas A&M campus.
But the Brazos Valley station may have suddenly become relevant. In May it was revealed that SpaceX selected the Gibbons Creek reservoir site for its proposed massive Terafab semiconductor factory, with economic incentive documents listing a $55 billion initial investment and a potential total investment of $119 billion. The proposed size of this facility is truly staggering, potentially 10 times larger than the massive Tesla factory in Austin, with a target production area around 100 million square feet (3.6 square miles).
SpaceX quickly received needed agreements in June and July, including a large tax investment zone called SpaceX Reinvestment Zone No. 1, which is reported to be 22,000 acres (34 square miles) in addition to the 4000-acre reservoir. Land clearing and foundation work was underway in August (video). I added the proposed station location to the map of the zone included in a Houston Business Journal article.
On August 6 SpaceX posted a video and depiction of the site on Terafab.ai. (HBJ report) The depiction below shows the massive factory on the southeast side of the reservoir, on the side of the property closest to the proposed train station. Of course this is preliminary and tentative, but the concepts are truly impressive. A post on X stated "Terafab looks more like a sci-fi city than a chip factory", to which Elon Musk responded, "Sci-fi city is what we're aiming for".
This rough size estimate from blogger Joe Tegtmeyer shows the approximate footprint, with the east side of the factory about 2 miles from the proposed station at Roans Prairie.
If Terafab moves forward as envisioned, it will create an entirely new city as suppliers and workforce move into the area. The rail project's prospects could receive a boost from the potential ridership resulting from Terafab.
It also causes me to speculate about another possible outcome for the FEIS corridor. Could Tesla take over the project and convert the alignment to a paved roadway for high-speed self-driving Robotaxis and possibly freight? This would drastically lower the cost of the project, perhaps to around five billion dollars (the cost at $20 million per mile), and make alignment adjustments much easier, since vehicles can accommodate more curving alignments compared to a train. A high-speed roadway would allow entrances and exits at just about any point and could provide service to rural areas, which could potentially extinguish rural oppostion, since they would receive a benefit from the project. While Robotaxis would be much slower than 200mph trains, they would provide on-demand service with no waiting, no security screenings and potentially point-to-point service between a customer's origin and destination, likely closing most of the time gap compared to 200mph trains. If there's one thing we can say about Elon Musk and his companies, it's that bold visions are possible.
UPDATE August 31, 2026: A drone video of the Tesla test track in Austin shows Cybercab vehicles going around the track in a platoon-like configuration, something we would expect to see on a dedicated Cybercab roadway. Go to timestamp 28:30 in this Youtube video by Joe Tegtmeyer.
UPDATE September 18, 2026: Cybercab testing in platoon-like configurations on the test track has been ongoing all September. In this September 16 video at timestamp 11:00, narrator Joe Tegtmeyer, who follows Tesla activity very closely, mentions that he still doesn't know the reason for the extensive testing of groups of vehicles, sometimes multiple groups on the track simultaneously with some groups very large. This testing is difficult to interpret because it does not correlate to driving on public roads, but it would match conditions on a dedicated high speed roadway for Robotaxis.
Screenshot from the video of Cybercabs going around the test track in a platoon-like configuration on August 31, 2026.
Terafab is also close to corridors under study for Interstate 14 and a new loop around Bryan-College Station, as shown in this map from the Interstate 14 study web site with annotations added.
The Grim Financials
There is a reason the project has been on hold since approval of the FEIS in 2020. The cost of building high-speed rail is absurdly high. The FEIS (page 45) estimated the capital cost to be between $16 billion and $19 billion in 2019.
When the federal Department of Transportation canceled a $63.9 million grant to Amtrak on April 14, 2025, the press release stated that the cost is expected to be over $40 billion.
In a July 2025 editorial, John Kleinheinz, chief executive of the firm that owns Texas High-Speed Rail Holdings, stated that the cost of the project is $35 billion. The cost of highway construction has actually declined 16.1% between May 2025 and May 2026. However, high speed rail requires extensive electrical infrastructure, and the data center boom has caused equipment shortages and cost increases, especially affecting transformers. So the 2026 project cost is likely around the same as 2025. I'll use $40 billion for illustrative calculations.
Even with the high cost of THSR, it's chump change compared to California High Speed Rail. That 500-mile project was estimated to cost $33 billion in 2008, but in 2026 the official cost estimate is $231 billion (page 18), and likely to go higher if history is a guide.
In England, the HS2 project going north from London was drastically scaled back due to outrageous costs. The entire project with a Y-shaped alignment serving London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds was estimated at 32 billion pounds ($43 billion) in 2011. As the cost escalated, the two lines north of Birmingham (to Manchester and Leeds) were canceled, and as of May 2026 the 140-mile line between London and Birmingham is expected to cost up to 103 billion pounds ($138 billion) with completion between 2036 and 2039. This is nearly $1 billion per mile — truly mind-boggling!
Even at the bargain-basement price of $40 billion for Texas high speed rail, let's consider the cost per rider. THSR claims they can get 6 million riders per year. A recent study by the Boston Consulting Group said 6.5 million is possible.
Federal 30-year treasury bonds have a yield of 5.14% as of July 21. Since bonds for a high speed rail project would be far more risky than treasury bonds, a 7% interest rate seems reasonable. Interest alone on a $40 billion bond issue at 7% is $2.8 billion per year. Divide that by 6 million riders, and the annual interest cost per rider is $467. (!!!)
The annual payment including principal for a 30-year bond would be $3.223 billion, which is $537 per rider. Of course, this doesn't include other costs like operations, maintenance and security.
For comparison, United shows a cost of $249 for a one-way ticket for immediate travel and between $220 and $249 for travel within 3 weeks. Advanced purchase prices (three weeks or more) are as low as $82. Southwest shows similar fares, between $230 and $249 for immediate or near-term travel, with the price dropping to $82 for a 24-day advance booking.
If these numbers tell us anything, it's that the project can only be done with substantial government funding — some combination of direct payments for construction and low-interest loans. I'm sure the project proponents have known this all along. They want to position the project to be "shovel-ready" in the event there is a large federal spending binge or stimulus, something like the inflation-causing $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. But with a negligible amount of right-of-way actually acquired, the project is nowhere near shovel-ready.
It will take a large government subsidy to overcome the sky-high construction cost. For example, suppose federal funding covers 50% of the $40 billion construction cost and provides a 2% interest rate loan for the remaining $20 billion. The annual bond payment including principal is $893 million and the capital cost per rider $149. Overall cost per rider (including operations) could plausibly be around $200, which would be competitive with airlines.
Can we get some facts and truth about this project?
Texas High-Speed Rail Holdings LLC needs to come clean about the project status. If the northwest Harris County alignment is dead, they need to make an announcement. If they plan to do a supplemental environmental impact study to identify a new alignment, they need to start efforts as soon as possible because the clock is ticking as new development proceeds quickly. An SEIS would be an indication that the project is not dead.
If they still plan to build on the FEIS alignment and bust through the neighborhoods and Blinn campus, they need to make their intentions clear and start protecting the corridor.
If the FEIS is obsolete, the Federal Railroad Administration page with the official documents needs to be updated with a disclaimer or clarification of the FEIS status.
If the project is dead, it would be proper etiquette to inform the folks in North Texas so they can stop going at each other's throats.
Without having inside information, it's difficult to know the true status of the project. But the prohibitively high $40 billion cost and development in the path of the planned alignment in northwest Harris County suggest the rail project is going nowhere.
But Terafab may create new possibilities for the approved FEIS corridor. I'll be tuned in to find out if Terafab has any influence on the future of the project.
September 19, 2026, afterword: Comments about the Channel 2 investigative report
On September 19 Channel 2 posted an investigative report about the high speed rail project for its Enough series, including a 10-minute video.
The report is a big disappointment. It has almost no new information and just recycles previous reporting.
  • They do nearly nothing to investigate the cost, only mentioning that Waller County Judge Trey Duhon says the cost is up to $50 billion. How about an official cost? If there is no official cost, how about saying there is none? How about mentioning what happened in California, with the cost going from $33 billion to $231 billion.
  • They should have interviewed the project owner, Kleinheinz Capital Partners. The video shows the reporter going to the long-abandoned office near downtown Dallas, but when the project representative gives them the correct address to Kleinheinz, they don't bother to visit. Reporter Eisenbaum says investigating the cost "took them to a place they never expected — the company's headquarters." Really? Kleinheinz should have been the top priority to visit. The report provides virtually nothing from Kleinheinz Partners, and no new information.
  • They don't mention the three subvisions which have been built in the path of the approved alignment, and the new Waller Campus of Blinn College being built in the path of the alignment. If the project proceeds, there will need to be a supplemental environmental impact statement which could take years.
  • They don't reference the official statement from the U.S. Department of Transportation about the grant cancellation, which states the grant was canceled to prevent the waste of federal money on more studies. From the official statement: "The project capital cost is now believed to be over $40 billion – making construction unrealistic and a risky venture for the taxpayer." "[Federal grants and massive loans underwritten by the federal government] is the antithesis to generating private investment in infrastructure because the American taxpayer ends up holding all the risk."
  • They rehash the old news about the White Oak Falls neighborhood.
  • There is no mention of Terafab being built near the proposed Brazos Valley station.
The only real news in the report is the interview with NCTCOG Director Michael Morris. Morris says, "I think you'll know if high speed rail will ever be built in this corridor in the next 18 months." If anyone knows what's going on, it's Morris, and his comment suggests the project is not yet dead.

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posted by Max Concrete @ 4:35 PM 7 comments