Tuesday, June 02, 2026

Houston Metro vs. Dallas DART: Houston wins as costly light rail nearly destroys DART

Updated 6/3/2026 to include the official announcement of the Dallas Stars moving to Plano
2026 has been very bad for downtown Dallas. On January 5, AT&T announced it will leave downtown to build a new $1.35 billion headquarters complex in Plano. In May, Fifth Third Bancorp announced it will leave downtown, vacating 222,900 square feet of space in a prominent towner. On June 1, the Dallas Mavericks announced they will leave American Airlines Center, with its DART light rail station, to move to the former Valley View Mall site along Interstate 635 (LBJ Freeway) in North Dallas with no light rail service. Like a one-two punch, the next bomb dropped on June 2 when the Dallas Stars officially announced they will leave downtown to move to the Shops at Willowbend site in Plano, which has no light rail service. These events are the culmination of years of decline for downtown Dallas (more below).
How can this be happening? Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) has 93 miles of high-quality light rail focused on downtown Dallas. Shouldn't light rail be an asset which attracts and retains downtown tenants? The typical response would be to say these departures are happening in spite of the light rail system serving downtown. But the more likely reality is that downtown lynchpins are fleeing partly because of the light rail system, and its affiliation (justified or unjustified) with unsavory elements and perceived high crime rate.
Earlier this year, DART had bigger problems than the ongoing loss of potential customers at its downtown hub. Six member cities, fed up with DART's high costs and unwillingness to share sales tax revenue, threatened to leave DART. In February a compromise was reached, preserving DART at least through 2031.
With all the news about DART, it's a good time to do an analysis of Houston's Metro vs. DART, to find out how the two agencies compare on key performance statistics. Spoiler alert: Houston performs far better in nearly every key statistic. The reason is because DART spent massively on downtown-focused, high-cost light rail. Houston has far less light rail, even with the cringe-worthy Green and Purple lines, which has enabled Metro to have much better financial performance.
This map shows the 119-mile DART light rail system and its connections to other rail service. The system is heavily focused on downtown Dallas, which is in serious decline while almost everywhere else in North Texas is booming.
Key Statistics
All data is for 2025 except as noted. (Metro, DART) Unusually bad statistics are highlighted with red, good statistics are highlighted with green.

Houston Metro DART
Year created 1978 1983
Service area 1307 sq miles 700 sq miles
Service area population 4,038,849 (2024, source) 2,646,340
Light rail miles 22.7 119
93 as of 2025
Light rail standards Low High
Employees 4,779 3,512
Sales tax rate 1% 1%
Sales tax collection $1,086 million $900.4 million
Per capita taxation $268.88 $340.23
Sales tax sharing with member cities 25% target
27.1% since 2002
23.3% since 2016		 none until 2026
5% in 2026
rising to 10% in 2031
Ridership (boardings) 78,642,439 54,175,258
Ridership per capita 19.5 20.5
Year of peak ridership 2006 2013
Ridership loss since peak -23.5% -24.0%
Ridership loss since Covid (U.S. average -15.2%) -12.6% -21.6%
Operating expense $1,076 million $1,021 million
Operating loss $1,027 million $959.1 million
Average taxpayer subsidy per boarding $13.07 $17.70
Long term debt $758.8 million (page 99) $4.027 billion (page 81)
Long term debt per capita $188 $1522
Interest on debt $28.1 million (page 100) $144.4 million (page 11)
Interest + principal $98.2 million (page 100) $210.8 million (page 83)
Ridership
DART steadily expanded its light rail system after the first opening in 1996, reaching 93 miles in 2014, all focused on downtown Dallas. (A 26-mile line from Plano to DFW airport opened in fiscal 2026 and is not included in ridership data.) Houston opened the first section of the Red Line in 2004 and the system reached 22.7 miles after expansion in 2014.
Houston Metro ridership peaked in 2006 and in 2025 was 23.5% below the peak and 12.5% below the pre-Covid 2019 ridership. DART ridership peaked in 2013 and in 2025 was 24.0% below the peak and 21.6% below 2019 ridership. In March 2026 the national average for ridership vs. 2019 is down 15.2%, so Metro is performing better than the national average and DART is worse.
The plot shows that DART's ridership between 2002 and 2019 was basically flat, even with huge spending on light rail. Of course ridership collapsed in 2020 due to Covid.
Metro and DART are now in a very similar position in terms of ridership. Per capita ridership is close, 19.5 for Metro and 20.5 for DART (see table). Metro is 23.5% below its peak and DART is 24.0% below its peak.
DART's extensive and costly light rail system, including DFW airport service, does not provide better ridership performance.
Sales Taxes, Revenue Sharing and the DART revolt
A huge flow of sales tax revenue goes into the bank accounts of Metro and DART. Inflation-adjusted tax collections are up 73.1% for Metro and 66.1% for DART since 2003.
While the population of the DART service area (2,646,340) is only 65.5% as large as Metro's (4,038,849 in 2024), DART sales tax collection is 82.9% as large as Metro's. DART's per capita taxation is $340.23 per year, and Metro's is $268.88 per year.
Houston Metro has had a formal policy of sharing sales tax revenue with member cities since 1988, traditionally called "general mobility" funding and, in financial statements, "local infrastructure assistance". The target for infrastructure assistance is 25% of sales tax revenue. 2025 was 30.1%, the 10-year average since 2016 is 23.3%, and the average since 2001 is 27.1%.
DART, however, never had a sales tax revenue sharing program. (There was a one-time transfer in 2022.) Certain member cities, particularly Plano, Farmers Branch and Irving, became increasingly frustrated about their high sales tax payments to subsidize high-cost DART, leaving them with no resources for other transportation needs. In recent years DART consistently refused to return sales tax revenue to member cities. Legislation was introduced in the Texas Legislature to mandate DART return 25% of its sales tax revenue to member cities, but the legislature was unwilling to get involved in the local issue. The situation came to a boiling point in 2026, when six member cities - Plano, Irving, Farmers Branch, Addison, University Park and Highland Park - scheduled elections to withdraw from DART. After months of negotiation, an agreement was reached for DART to share some sales tax revenue with member cities, starting at 5% in 2026 and reaching 10% in 2031. Plano, Irving and Farmers Branch canceled their withdrawal referendums. Addison, University Park and Highland Park proceeded with elections, and only Highland Park voted to withdraw.
DART's high costs and unwillingness to share revenue nearly resulted in the collapse of the agency. In contrast, Metro's longstanding revenue sharing targeting 25% has empowered member cities to meet their local mobility needs.
Taxpayer Subsidy per Boarding
Average subsidy per boarding is the cost covered by taxpayers every time someone steps onto a bus or train. A transit roundtrip is two boardings. This subsidy is calculated by dividing the operating loss by the number of boardings.
While both Metro and DART have high average boarding subsidies, DART's $17.70 subsidy is significantly worse than Metro's $13.07.
The DART web site scorecard page (click Finance button) reports the bus boarding subsidy is $13.93, the light rail subsidy is $11.73, and the paratransit subsidy is $72.92 in April 2026. In my view the average subsidy per boarding for all services is the best indicator of agency cost and the best number for comparison.
Debt and Interest Payments
DART incurred substantial debt to build its light rail system. The 2025 financial statement shows $4.027 billion in long-term debt.
Houston Metro's financial statement shows $758.8 million in long-term debt. Metro's per-capita debt of $188 is only 12% of DART's $1522.
Metro's interest payment is only $28.1 million per year, compared to $144.4 million for DART.
Houston is in a vastly better position than DART, with far lower debt and lower interest payments. Page 18 of the Metro annual report states, "The debt payable balance has been declining during the last several years as principal payments were made, and the amortization of premium/discount occurred." Metro acheived this superior financial position because it built much less light rail, even with the ill-advised Green and Purple Lines and their disastrous ridership.
Light Rail Doesn't Save Downtown Dallas
An extensive light rail system focused on downtown should help ensure a vibrant and growing downtown, right? No, not in Dallas. Downtown Dallas has generally been stagnant or in decline since light rail service started 1996.
After AT&T, the Dallas Mavericks and the Dallas Stars dropped their departure bombs, the outlook for downtown Dallas became increasingly grim. The downtown office vacancy rate is projected to reach 35% after AT&T and other departures.
On December 28, 2025, the Wall Street Journal reported on downtown Dallas with an article "Dallas Is Booming—Except for Its Downtown"
DALLAS — This city is a hotbed for commercial property. The metro area’s population is booming and financial-services firms are flocking here, earning the area the sobriquet “Y’all Street.”
Yet at its heart is one of the country’s worst-hit central business districts: Downtown Dallas.
Companies are abandoning this neighborhood and its aging office towers. They are heading to the Uptown district or the thriving suburbs, often over concerns about crime and homelessness. Left behind are defaulted loans, foreclosures and deeply discounted property sales.
Dallas’s downtown has the second-highest office vacancy rate of any in the nation, behind Seattle. Downtown Dallas, the central business district, was at 27.2% at the end of the third quarter, according to real-estate data firm CoStar. In Dallas’s Preston Center district, 7 miles away, the office vacancy rate was only 5.9%.
The Wall Street Journal recently reported on downtown Denver, another city which built extensive train service to downtown, only to see its downtown become a wasteland as employers fled to the suburbs. "Can This Guy Get People to Live in America’s Emptiest Downtown?"
America’s downtowns are suffering a crisis. Office work has migrated into the suburbs, leaving abandoned buildings and blighted conditions behind. Central business districts from St. Louis to Dallas and Portland, Ore., are fighting to escape a death spiral.
Downtown Houston has had and continues to have struggles, with office vacancy at 28.9% in March. (The Wall Street Journal report used older or different data.) I think downtown Houston is in a better position than downtown Dallas, but that subject is beyond the scope of this post.
Conclusion
Here are the consequences of of DART's high-mileage, high-cost, downtown-focused light rail system
  • Inability (and unwillingness) to share sales tax revenue with member cities, leading to a revolt which put the agency's future at risk
  • High debt, 5.3 times higher than Metro, with per-capita debt 8 times higher than Metro
  • Downtown Dallas is among the worst performing downtowns in the United States, with lynchpins AT&T, Dallas Mavericks and Dallas Stars announcing departures this year.
  • Long-term ridership comparable to Metro, but worse than Metro and the national average since Covid
  • A sky-high $17.70 average boarding subsidy ($35.40 for a roundtrip)
  • High per-capita taxation, $340.23 vs. $268.88 for Metro
In the Houston vs. Dallas transit performance contest, Houston wins by a landslide, mainly because Houston has built much less light rail.
As I've posted in the past, the future of public transit is new, low-cost technology: automated Robotaxis and low-cost tunnel transit built by The Boring Company.

Labels: , , , , , ,

posted by Max Concrete @ 9:32 PM 0 comments