Saturday, November 15, 2025

A (hopefully) momentary lapse of reason at TxDOT

This week we have another excellent analytical post from Oscar Slotboom debunking TXDoT's fairly insane state transit plan. Let's hope this thing goes on a shelf somewhere never to be opened again...
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TxDOT recently published a 91-page report called "Texas State Multimodal Transit Plan 2050", with a shorter executive summary also available (KUHF NPR story). This sprawling document is so heavily overloaded with pro-transit fallacies, platitudes and bogus numbers that it cannot be debunked in a single post.
The staff or consultants at TxDOT who authored this report are either grossly uninformed or delusional about the ability of public transit to serve transportation needs.
The best response to the report is this: we've had large increases in transit agency budgets and massive spending on rail systems in recent decades, and transit ridership goes DOWN, both in Texas and nationally, even with ongoing population increases, strong economic growth, and increasing roadway traffic.
Houston transit ridership peaked in 2006
Regular readers of this blog have seen my analysis of Houston Metro's annual statements. Ridership peaked at in 2006. Ridership never fully recovered from the 2008 recession. Heavy spending on bus improvements in the 2010s held ridership flat, but then Covid in 2020 cut ridership in half and it has slowly recovered during the last five years.
Dallas: extensive rail system plagued by low ridership
DART's 93-mile light rail system is one of the most extensive in the United States. It is built to much higher standards than Houston's MetroRail, nearly entirely on dedicated right-of-way, including a subway, long elevated sections and DFW airport service.
The first section of DART light rail opened in 1996. It was steadily expanded in the 2000s and 2010s, reaching its current 93-mile length in 2021. As the plot shows, overall (bus and rail) ridership growth before Covid was minimal with the massive rail investment, only 5.6% between 2002 and 2018, but 17.1% between 2002 and 2019 due to a spike in 2019. Then Covid hit and 2024 overall DART ridership is 23.4% below the 2013 peak.
DART's ridership page reports 68,700 weekday light rail boardings in September 2025, which is around 34,350 riders making a roundtrip. For comparison, Houston's busiest bus line, 82-Westheimer, had 14,345 boardings. Rider security has always been a challenge for DART. In October there were two fatal shootings on the light rail system (1, 2), and a non-fatal shooting this month. DART ridership has had a weaker recovery from Covid than Houston, and it will likely take a very long time for DART to reach pre-Covid ridership, if ever.
A post I did in 2021 revealed that the DART Las Colinas station, in the middle of an area with dense apartments in all directions, had the second-lowest ridership of all stations in the DART system. (plot) So much for transit-oriented development!
The Los Angeles ridership disaster
Around 2010, Los Angeles (excluding Orange County) ended virtually all freeway improvements and put all its resources into public transit. The result: steadily decreasing ridership since 2013, with overall ridership down 36.8% in 2024. Hugely expensive investments in rail systems are especially disastrous, with ridership down 43.5% since the 2013 peak and down 30.7% from the 2019 pre-Covid value.
National Data
This plot from the Antiplanner based on data from the National Transit Database shows flat or declining transit ridership since around 2007, with steadily escalating operating costs during this period.
Taxpayers get stuck with the large subsidy bill
Public transit operating expenses and operating losses (i.e. taxpayer subsidy) have escalated in the last 25 years, including Houston. The plot below shows the operating loss from audited financial statements, which in 2024 was $939 million for Houston and $952 million for Dallas.
Page 64 of the TxDOT document predicts continued rapid escalation of operating expenses.
With flat or declining ridership and costs going up, taxpayer subsidy per boarding have soared upward. In 2024 Houston taxpayers contributed $12.37 every time someone stepped on a Metro bus or train. The only good news is that per-boarding subsidy in Houston is much lower than Dallas and subsidies have been decreasing since peak Covid impact in 2021. (See post with time series)

Year Operating Loss
millions
Ridership
millions
Subsidy per boarding
Houston 2024 $938.6 75.859 $12.37
Dallas 2024 $952.1 54.573 $17.45
Los Angeles 2023 $2,639 270.179 $9.77
Lowball Cost Numbers
As usual, pro-transit documents use unrealistically low cost numbers. For example, it says that light rail costs $200-250 per mile (pages 33, 62). This listing of new projects on the Federal Transit Administration site shows seven light projects which vary in cost between $153 and $964 million per mile, with the average cost $408 million per mile. The current cost estimate for the planned 9.8-mile Austin light rail system, which will run on surface streets like Houston's MetroRail, is now a stunning $8.2 billion, or $840 million per mile. From the article: "Soaring rail transit costs are 'not necessarily unique to Austin,' said transit engineer Chetan Sharma. 'It’s essentially a national problem.'"
Page 62 says bus rapid transit costs $30-65 million per mile, but the suspended 25-mile Metro University BRT was estimated to cost $2.2 billion, $88 million per mile. Metro's Gulfton BRT is included on the FTA list at $54 million per mile.
Page 44 says that intercity high-speed rail costs $65 million per mile, but the most recent cost number for the 240-mile Texas Central project is "over $40 billion", or over $167 million per mile. The most recent cost estimate for California high-speed rail is $135 billion and the ultimate cost is surely much higher. The system length for this cost is not clear, but phase 1 is listed at 494 miles, which would be $273 million per mile.
On page 43 there is a section for "Funding Intercity Connectivity" which states "A high-level analysis estimates that building rail and bus infrastructure would require an estimated $30 to $40 billion in capital investment and operating costs greater than $5 billion annually." It's impossible to analyze this statement without any project details, but if this number includes Texas Central then it is far too low. This is a huge cost, and history tells us any such spending will not increase transit ridership and probably become a Los Angeles-style disaster.
Look to new technology to save public transit (and taxpayers)
There are powerful forces at work pushing down public transit ridership, and no amount of public transit spending can overcome them. Before Covid, employers were steadily relocating from downtown to suburban locations which are very difficult or impossible to serve with transit. Then Covid hit in 2020, greatly increasing work from home. On the horizon are driverless vehicles, which could deliver yet another blow to transit ridership.
Attempting to solve future transportation needs with absurdly expensive legacy transit solutions is a recipe for disaster, both for ridership and taxpayers. The only way we'll ever get better results for transit expenditures is with new technology. Fortunately, technologies are in development which could eventually deliver much-needed productivity improvements for transit and nearby intercity travel.
While driverless vehicles did not deliver on their initial hype, Tesla and Google's Waymo are making steady progress toward service rollouts. Waymo recently expanded to freeway service in three cities, and driverless taxi services - "robotaxi" - are now Tesla's main focus to achieve future profits, with Tesla's latest self-driving software FSD v14 getting mostly good reviews. In 5 to 10 years, these technologies may be viable and, like all new technologies, we can expect prices to drop. Driverless taxis will be ideal for many public transit needs, particularly for rural and exurban transit discussed in the TxDOT document.
The Boring Company is actively building projects in Las Vegas and Nashville. If successful, this technology will provide an affordable alternative to legacy public transit tunneling, which now costs a minimum of $1 billion per mile and is financially prohibitive.
For longer distances between cities, there are many companies developing electric-powered vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft. (Full list) Joby, Archer and Beta are the best-known American companies developing taxis. Joby is scheduled to begin commercial service in Dubai in 2026, and Archer recently purchased the Hawthorne Municipal airport near LAX to base its operations. Flight speeds are comparable to high-speed rail, although initial ranges are expected to be around 100 miles. Of course we can expect improvements in range, and Beta CTOL (C=conventional) lists a range of 387 miles. If these technologies become reality, they could be far more practical than a high-speed rail project.
Suppose you are in the Woodlands or Clear Lake City area and you want to go to Plano. With Texas Central high-speed rail, you would need to fight traffic to the Texas Central station at the Northwest Mall site, then buy a ticket which Texas Central has stated will be priced comparable to airline service. In Dallas you would still need to cover the long distance from downtown Dallas to Plano. A VTOL could leave from Hooks Airport or Ellington Field and go to Addison or McKinney Airport (much closer to Plano), or perhaps a VTOL port very close to activity centers in Plano like Legacy. Capital costs will be minimal, instead of at least $40 billion for Texas Central. Repeat this scenario for an innumerable number of start-to-end points, like Sugar Land to Austin, Katy to Waco, Baytown to Fort Worth, etc.
Company Model Top Speed Range
Joby Aviation S4 200 mph 100 to 150 miles
Archer Midnight 150 mph 100 miles
Beta Alia VTOL 176 mph (not listed)
Beta Alia CTOL 176 mph 387 miles

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Friday, November 07, 2025

How Houston can silence those ear-blasting cars and trucks!

This week the Houston Chronicle published my op-ed calling for noise cameras in Houston (thank you shout out to Evan and Lisa!). I would also like to post it here for posterity. As a resident of Midtown I can't tell you how often I hear cars driving down Bagby with their stereos so loud they rattle windows, even at 2am in the morning! 😠 I really hope the City (as well as Midtown and other TIRZs) strongly consider these noise cameras being used in other parts of the country.  The fine revenue will more than cover the cost of the cameras! Please pass along to any officials you know - thank you.

How Houston can silence those ear-blasting cars and trucks

Noise cameras would give police — and residents — a tool to fight back

Anyone living in Midtown or along the Washington Corridor knows the sound. It’s the nightly, window-rattling roar of illegally modified exhausts, blasting stereos, and aggressively revved engines. This isn’t the ambient hum of a vibrant city. It’s an assault on our quality of life, a degradation of our property, and a symptom of growing public disorder.

Or, as Mayor John Whitmire succinctly put it in a recent New York Times article: “Too loud, too loud, too loud!”

The problem is not just anecdotal. It’s a quantifiable crisis. A recent study ranked Houston as the second-loudest city in America (after only Los Angeles). Between September 2022 and May 2025, Houstonians filed over 100,000 noise complaints with the Houston Police Department. HPD’s Central Division, which covers Midtown, saw over 11,000 of those calls, making it one of the city’s worst hotspots.

Our current enforcement model is a demonstrable failure. Residents call 311 or the HPD non-emergency line, but by the time an overstretched officer can respond, the offender is long gone. The result is an enforcement gap where our laws are rendered meaningless. Houston’s Code of Ordinances already prohibits excessively noisy vehicles, but without an effective tool, the ordinance is just ink on paper.

It’s time for a pragmatic, technological solution: automated noise enforcement. As a recent Wall Street Journal report detailed, cities like New York and Newport are successfully deploying “noise cameras.” These devices use a certified microphone paired with a high-definition camera. When a vehicle violates a set decibel limit, the system automatically records the sound level and captures an image of the license plate, allowing the city to mail a citation to the owner.

This is a surgical tool, not a surveillance dragnet. It’s a force multiplier for HPD, allowing officers to focus on more serious crime instead of chasing sonic ghosts.

Critics will inevitably cry foul, mistakenly claiming that Texas banned all automated cameras. This is legally false. The Legislature’s prohibitions are narrowly and precisely written, and only apply to cameras that work in conjunction with traffic-control signals — such as cameras that catch red-light runners — or cameras that enforce the speed limit

Neither prohibition applies to noise cameras.

A noise camera citation would be for violating Houston’s Chapter 30 noise code — a local quality-of-life issue — not a moving violation under the state’s transportation code. This is a crucial distinction that places noise enforcement squarely within the city’s home-rule authority.

The path forward is the Houston way: a limited, data-driven pilot program. Let’s deploy a handful of these cameras in the worst-offending areas, like Midtown. We can follow New York City’s model, which established a clear noise threshold — 85 decibels, roughly the threshold for safe exposure — and a steep civil penalty structure that starts at $800 to create a real deterrent. The revenue should be dedicated to public safety and traffic-calming infrastructure to prove the goal is peace, not profit.

Restoring tranquility to our urban neighborhoods isn’t an anti-car policy — it’s a pro-Houston policy. It protects the property values of homeowners and the investments of small businesses. It makes our streets more attractive for pedestrians, outdoor dining, and residential life, creating a virtuous cycle of vitality. We have a serious problem and a proven, legal solution. It’s time for City Hall to act.

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Wednesday, October 29, 2025

Houston METRO Ridership Update

This week we have yet another excellent analytical blog post from Oscar Slotboom (he's on a roll!)
Metro's 2025 fiscal year ended at the end of September. Bill King has some good commentary about Metro's ridership in his most recent blog post, especially on the topics of light rail and Uptown BRT.
Metro's annual financial report becomes available in early April, which is when I do the comprehensive analysis of Metro's performance. Metro recently posted its September ridership data, so now is a good time for an updated monthly ridership plot. September and October are the highest ridership months of the year, so September looks good compared to the 12-month pre-Covid average (which includes low-ridership months).
As usual, I focus on weekday boardings. Overall weekday boardings of 260,782 in September is a post-Covid high, 14.0% below September 2019 and 8.2% below the 12-month pre-Covid average. Metro ridership continues to outperform the national average, which has been about 20% below 2019 in recent months.
Bus ridership of 197,494 is 2.8% below September 2019 and 3.7% above the 12-month pre-Covid average. If the current trend continues, we should see bus ridership reach the pre-Covid corresponding monthly values as soon as 2026.
MetroRail continues to perform poorly. September was 32.0% below September 2019, 3.3% below September 2024 and 27.5% below the 12-month pre-Covid average. While bus ridership has had continuous improvement, light rail ridership has been flat for the last three years.
Park and ride service continues its slow, incremental improvement from its near-total collapse in 2020. September was 45.9% below September 2019 and 41.2% below the 12-month pre-Covid average.

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Wednesday, October 22, 2025

Highways: costs are way up, funding is in decline. What's the Impact on Houston?

This week we have another excellent analytical blog post from Oscar Slotboom.
An agenda item for the October 24 H-GAC Transportation Policy Council meeting includes a spate of delays to projects in the Transportation Improvement Plan. 18 projects and 18 right-of-way acquisition programs are being delayed.
Delayed projects include the items listed below. The new project year for most projects is listed as 2029, but realistically we can expect more delays since most are not included in TxDOT's 2029 information dashboard (see section below "Planned Contracts in the Next 4 Years").

Updated project year
Connecting the SH 35 freeway extension to Loop 610 2029
Widening the Gulf Freeway to 8 lanes on Galveston Island, including direct connections at 61st Street 2029
Interstate 10 Widening from Katy to Brookshire 2029
Direct connectors at the Gulf Freeway and Grand Parkway segment B 2028
SH 249 inside Beltway 8 (West Mount Houston Road), widen to 8 lanes 2029
US 290 in Waller County, widen to 6 main lanes 2033
Inner Katy BRT (Metro) 2033
SH 6 at FM 529 2029
Delays to right-of-way acquistion include the following (NHHIP section map)

Updated project year
NHHIP 3C-2 (I-69 at I-10) 2028
NHHIP 2A (I-10 to Loop 610) 2031
NHHIP 2B (Loop 610 interchange) 2034
NHHIP Segment 1 (Loop 610 to BW 8) 2034-35
I-10 East San Jacinto Bridge 2030
This HGAC action is no surprise to anyone who closely watches TxDOT letting schedules (which includes me), since there is a reduction in non-tolled contracts in fiscal year 2026 compared to fiscal year 2025. The H-GAC document revision is an administrative confirmation of the funding reality for Houston projects.
Project delivery gets a double punch: dramatically increased costs and lower funding
We've seen this story before, especially in the mid 1970s (page 31). The post-Covid spate of inflation has increased Texas construction costs 67% since August 2021. Nationally, costs are up about 65% between Q1 2021 and Q1 2025 (the most recent data online). With flat revenue, this results in a 40% reduction in the amount of projects which can be awarded.
TxDOT's bank balance was nearly $10 billion as of January 2024, but was $3.5 billion as of May 2025 and is projected to be around zero by March 2026. This drawdown allowed a surge of project spending in 2024. The TxDOT chart says "Negative balances, if any, will be avoided through the issuance of short-term borrowing and other cash management strategies." If I were the TxDOT financial controller, I would reduce contract awards to avoid the risk of an empty bank account and the costs associated with short-term borrowing.
Contract awards for non-tolled projects statewide were generally $1 billion per month in fiscal years 2024 and 2025 (which ended in August), with an average of $1.01 billion per month in FY 2025. In fiscal year 2026 (now in progress) the average for non-toll projects is $824 million. In the screenshot for FY 2026, the spike in June is due to the $1.9 billion tolled Grand Parkway segment B, which will issue bonds for funding. Including toll funding, the monthly average is $980 million.
Planned Contracts in the Next 4 Years
TxDOT lists the projects expected to be let for construction in the next four fiscal years. This data is accurate for the current year (above the thick border line) and is subject to frequent change beyond the current year. This list has large Houston projects (over $100 million, or on freeways/tollways) currently scheduled. As this shows, the only major contracts in the Houston region in this fiscal year are based on toll revenue. NHHIP projects, with yellow background, appear to have priority over other projects but are delayed compared to the online schedule. The next big NHHIP projects are two years away, scheduled for letting in June 2027, October 2027 and March 2028.
Scheduled Amount
Feb 2026 $77 million US 290 new underpass as Skinner Road
Apr 2026 $166 million (Toll) SH 99 (Grand Parkway), widen to 6 lanes between I-10 and West Road
Jun 2026 $1.876 billion (Toll) SH 99 (Grand Parkway) segment B, build new toll road from Gulf Freeway to SH 35
Feb 2027 $113 million FM 521 (Almeda Road), widen south of Highway 6
May 2027 $114 million (Toll) SH 99, widen to 6 lanes west of I-45 (North Freeway)
Jun 2027 $273 million NHHIP 3C-3 (I-10 in UH-downtown area)
Oct 2027 $866 million NHHIP 3A (I-69 from Spur 527 to SH 288)
Dec 2027 $52 million (Toll) SH 99 (Grand Parkway), widen to 6 lanes from Kuykendahl to Holzwarth
Feb 2028 $253 million connections between SH 99 segment B and Gulf Freeway
Mar 2028 $180 million NHHIP 3C-1 (I-10 Gregg to Waco St)
Mar 2028 $1.78 billion NHHIP 3C-2 (Interchange at I-69 and I-10)
Sep 2028 $672 million NHHIP 3C-4 (I-10/I-45 interchange northwest of downtown)
Oct 2028 $324 million I-10 Katy Freeway, Mason Rd to Pin Oak Rd
Oct 2028 $78.5 million (Toll) SH 99 Grand Parkway west of SH 249, widen from 4 to 6 lanes
Dec 2028 $270 million widen I-10 in Brookshire, FM 359 to Igloo Road
Mar 2029 $159 million SH 288 widen to 8 lanes Loop 610 to Sims Bayou
Projects Most Affected By Delays
The only projects which are minimally affected by the funding shortfall are the toll projects, Grand Parkway Segment B and widening of the Grand Parkway between the Katy Freeway and North Freeway. The projects below are most affected and are delayed into the 2030s.
  • NHHIP downtown projects not listed above, and all projects north of downtown facing possible years of delays.
  • Inner Katy managed lanes and BRT
  • I-10 Katy Freeway, Katy to Brookshire
  • I-10 East Freeway San Jacinto River Bridge
  • SH 35 connection to Loop 610
No Help From HCTRA to Fill the Gap
HCTRA has historically stepped up to expand the toll road system to meet Houston's needs, and also contributed to projects like the Katy Freeway and US 290. But not anymore. As I have reported previously, HCTRA has drastically curtailed its construction program in spite of near-record revenue in recent years. "Surplus" revenue has been diverted out of HCTRA, and the only large project to be awarded since 2019 is for four direct connectors at SH 225.
Outlook
The current Federal transportation funding act, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, expires on September 20, 2026. A big question is whether or not current federal funding levels can be maintained with the deteriorating financial status of the federal government. Much of the funding in IIJA was provided by debt, not by traditional gasoline tax revenue.
A significant component of state-generated TxDOT funding is proposition 1, which relies on oil & gas severance tax revenue and contributed $2.74 billion in 2025. Funding from this source is probably going to be lower in the near future due to lower energy prices.

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Wednesday, October 15, 2025

New Zealand VIP visits Houston, HISD as a model of education reform, Texas MUDs, and young adult views on Houston

 Catching up on a few smaller items from my slow-posting summer:

  • Got to have a bbq dinner with New Zealand government minister Chris Bishop in July to brief him on Houston and Texas policies that keep housing affordable (NZ houses are about 3x what they are here, similar to CA). He's in casual clothes before an overnight flight returning to NZ, lol. 

  1. Houston's young adults (18-34) highly value the city's diversity, community, and lifestyle, seeing them as the best aspects of living there.
  2. The city's affordability and lifestyle are particularly attractive to Gen Z and young millennials who are delaying traditional life milestones for financial reasons.
  3. Most young adults have a positive outlook on Houston's culture, recreational activities, and higher education opportunities.
  4. The primary reasons young adults choose to stay in Houston are the life they've built there and proximity to family and friends, rather than solely job opportunities.

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Sunday, September 21, 2025

A new seal for the City of Houston

The Chronicle asked the public for updated alternatives to the old City of Houston seal, which is definitely looking a bit dated at this point:


So I submitted this with a little help from AI, which they published! 

Tory Gattis, Harris County: This concept features a modern and stylized representation of a bridge, symbolizing a pathway to success and a connection to the community. The clean lines and vibrant colors reflect an energetic and forward-looking city. This logo is optimistic and welcoming, embodying the spirit of "The Opportunity City." It would also be super-cool to integrate the "Be Someone" bridge into the logo, although that would require the city to protect it going forward. 

Some of the other submissions were also quite good and had great elements to them. But a lot of them also use elements that are not timeless and will run into the same issues as the current aging seal, like the downtown skyline or oil rigs or rockets. It’s hard to make something timeless, which mine kinda does (accidentally). I also just noticed the two sides of the bridge in mine are red and blue coming together, a nice subtle political reference. Houston has always done best when it operates in a working together ‘purple’ manner.

Honestly, I doubt the City will really consider undergoing a revamp, as it would create a ton of political interests weighing in and end up as some bland compromise-by-committee monstrosity 🙄

Let me know what you think in the comments!

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Thursday, August 07, 2025

The Gulfton Fallacy: Don't Let Zoning's 'Perfect' Be the Enemy of Houston's Good

The Houston Chronicle just published a shorter version of this as a Letter to the Editor, but here is the full version.

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The recent call to use the Gulfton neighborhood as a poster child for imposing city-wide zoning (“I'm an urban planning expert from Houston. It's time we talk about zoning again.” Houston Chronicle 8/1/25) is the latest verse in a seductive but dangerous song. Words like “planning” and “zoning” poll well because they offer a vague cure-all for the complexities of a dynamic city. It’s an understandable impulse, but it’s a trap—a classic case of the “grass is always greener” fallacy, where a theoretical, perfect version of zoning is imagined, while the grim reality of its failures elsewhere is ignored.

Before we consider dismantling the very system that has made Houston a beacon of opportunity, we must take an honest account of what that system delivers. Houston’s status as one of America’s most affordable and dynamic major cities is the direct result of our unique light regulatory touch. Our ability to build new housing at a rate reportedly up to 14 times that of our zoned peers is the core of our success. This is why Houston largely avoided the catastrophic housing bubbles that devastated other regions and why our home price-to-income ratio remains the envy of the nation.

The contrast with heavily zoned cities is stark. While Texas has approximately 90 homeless individuals per 100,000 residents, California’s rate is nearly five times higher, fueled by a regulatory crisis that can push the cost of a single “affordable” housing unit to over $500,000. Houston prioritizes building, which results in a higher standard of living for those with resources and more humane options for those without.

A critical part of our success has been smart, inner-loop densification, unleashed by pragmatic lot-size reforms. The resulting townhome boom created tens of thousands of new homes, the very “missing middle” housing that has effectively become illegal to build in most American cities. On expensive urban land that, under a restrictive zoning regime, would either become a massive McMansion or remain blighted, Houston gets thousands of new homes affordable to middle-income families.

The city-wide zoning now being contemplated, using Gulfton as an example, is a recipe for exclusion. It would hand a powerful tool to NIMBYs all over the city to kill development and force stagnation. This isn’t a guess; it’s the lived reality of every major zoned city, where restrictions choke supply, drive up prices, and displace the very people they claim to protect. Furthermore, this push, like the recent attempt to create so-called “conservation districts,” is an undemocratic end-run around the City Charter and the will of Houston voters, who have decisively rejected zoning three separate times.

The choice is not between chaos and zoning. Houston is not “unplanned”; it is largely privately planned through a robust system of voluntary deed restrictions. This provides the best of both worlds: neighbors who want zoning-like protections can have them, while the city as a whole can grow and adapt. For specific conflicts, we use surgical tools like buffering ordinances, not a sledgehammer.

Cities across America are now desperately trying to liberalize their land-use rules to achieve a fraction of the affordability and dynamism we take for granted. For Houston to voluntarily inflict this self-destructive disease upon itself would be a historic tragedy. We are the model other cities are trying to emulate. Let’s not break what works.

Tory Gattis is the editor of the Houston Strategies blog and a Founding Senior Fellow with the Urban Reform Institute.

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Saturday, July 12, 2025

The Original Three Sections of the Sam Houston Tollway Pay for Themselves Every 3 Years

This week we have another excellent analytical guest post from Oscar Slotboom:
In the recent legislative session Representative Shaheen, representing the North Dallas suburbs, introduced a bill to end perpetual tolling. The bill required that a tollway becomes a freeway after all construction costs are paid, with the facility transferred to either TxDOT or the county for free operation.
The bill didn't make it out of committee, but it did remind me that I and hundreds of thousands of toll payers are victims of the most flagrant instance of perpetual tolling in Texas: the original three sections of the Sam Houston Tollway.
Construction cost with interest: around $978 million
The approval of the Harris Country Tollway Authority (HCTRA) by voters in 1983 with $900 million bond funding authorized the construction of the original three sections of the Sam Houston Tollway and the Hardy Toll Road. Section 1 from US 59 (Southwest Freeway) to I-10 (Katy Freeway) opened in June 1988, section 2 from I-10 to US 290 opened in June 1989 and section 3 from US 290 to I-45 (North Freeway) opened in July 1990. One lane in each direction was added in the early 2000s.
Original cost, 1980s, millions* $420
Interest, estimated 5% for 30 years $400
Widening, early 2000s** 81.1
Interest, estimated 5% for 30 years 77.2
Estimated Total Cost $978 million
*Press report    **HCTRA document
Three-year revenue: $1.04 billion
Looking at the three most recent HCTRA financial statements for 12-month periods (there was a transitional 7-month fiscal year in 2022), these three sections of the Sam Houston Tollway generated $1.038 billion in revenue.
2021 (millions) $351.45
2023 $342.39
2024 $344.25
Total Revuene $1.038 billion
HCTRA data for the original three sections is available back to 2001. Since 2001, these three sections have generated $5.95 billion in revenue, which is $7.97 billion in today's dollars.
Of course, there are operation and maintenance expenses. If this expense is $10 million per year, it is only 3% of annual revenue. Other improvement costs were also incurred, such as connection ramps to the SH 249 Tomball Parkway and Westpark Tollway, ramp modifications, toll plaza modifications and miscellanous work like lighting. This HCTRA document shows they are all small costs over the last 25 years, adding up to less than one year of current toll revenue.
A previous blog post reported on the huge diversions of toll revenue to the Harris County budget, which has amounted to $1.486 billion in the last 5 annual reports, averaging $297 million per year.
With tolls in place 35 to 37 years, high toll rates and heavy traffic, the typical toll payer on the original three sections of the Sam Houston Tollway is surely thinking that the toll road paid for its construction cost long ago. Yes, this is correct. Now the tolls are being used to finance diversions of toll revenue to Harris County.
Should tolling at high rates continue perpetually?
If you are a toll payer, the answer is almost surely no. If you are a government official distributing "surplus" toll money or an entity receiving the money from toll payers, you surely want tolling to continue.
Of course, work-from-home employees can avoid tolls. These workers are usually higher-paid professionals. Lower paid service workers don't have the option to work from home, such as those working in warehousing, education, health care, construction, industrial and Bush airport operations. These lower-paid folks are paying the price for perpetual tolling on the original three sections of the Sam Houston Tollway.

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